Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1988

State of Utah v. James L. Sandoval, Robert L.
Sandoval, and Patrick Domniquez : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
J. Bruce Reading; Morgan, Scalley & Reading; Attorney for Appellant.
Steven B. Killpack; Utah County Attorney\'s Office; Attorneys for Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Sandoval, No. 880485 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1288

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

BRIEF
JTAH
DOCUMENT
<FU
50
A10

DOCKET NO.

%*(H*S-CA
IN THE UTAH COtJRT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

\ r

-04bb

vs.

Case No.<

JAMES L. SANDOVAL, ROBERT L.
SANDOVAL, and PATRICK DOMINQUEZ,

Argument Priority
Classification 2

Defendants/Appellants.
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/APPEL} TS, JAMES L. SANDOVAL,
ROBERT L. SANDOVAL,
tl PATRICK DOMINQUEZ
Appeal from ju timent of the
Fourth Judicial District C iirt of Utah County, Utah
Honorable Cullen Y. (fehristensen, Judge

STEVEN B- KILLPACK
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEYS OFFICE
37 East Center, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84601
(801) 373-0136

J. BRUCE READING, #27 00
MORGAN, SGALLEY & READING
261 East 300 South, No* 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 531-7870

Attorneys for
Plaintiff/Respondent

Attorneys for
Defendants/Appellants

Ml
OCT 3 1988
COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

:

JAMES L. SANDOVAL, ROBERT L.
SANDOVAL, and PATRICK DOMINQUEZ,
Defendants/Appellants.

Case No. 880106-CA
Argument Priority
Classification 2

:

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS, JAMES L. SANDOVAL,
ROBERT L. SANDOVAL, and PATRICK DOMINQUEZ
Appeal from judgment of the
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, Utah
Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen, Judge

STEVEN B. KILLPACK
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
37 East Center, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84601
(801) 373-0136

J. BRUCE READING, #2700
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING
261 East 300 South, No. 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 531-7870

Attorneys for
Plaintiff/Respondent

Attorneys for
Defendants/Appellants

TABLE OF CONTENTS
JURISDICTION

1

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.
NATURE OF THE CASE
B.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
C.
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT
D.
RELEVANT FACTS

2
2
2
10
11

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

14

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
THE DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS POSSESSED THE
SPECIFIC INTENT REQUIRED TO SUSTAIN A
CONVICTION OF BURGLARY UNDER UTAH CODE
ANN. § 7 6 - 6 - 2 0 2 ( 1 9 7 8 )

15
15

CONCLUSION

23

APPENDIX
DECREE OF DIVORCE,
ENTERED JULY
31,
1 9 8 6 , BY THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
CASE NO. C V - 8 6 - 8 6 4

26

t

•

11

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Peck v. Dunn. 574 P.2d 367 (Utah 1978)

16, 17

State v. Brooks. 631 P.2d 878 (Utah 1981)

19

State v. Clements. 488 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1971)

16

State v. Evans. 74 Utah 389, 279 P. 950 (1929)

22

State V. Hill. 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986)

23

State v. Hopkins. 359 P.2d 486 (Utah 1960)

19

State v. Pitts. 728 P.2d 113 (Utah 1986)

22

State v. Porter. 705 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Utah 1985)

19

State v. Sisneros. 631 P.2d 856 (Utah 1981)

19

State v. Tellay. 324 P.2d 490 (Utah 1958)

19

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1978)

2

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1978)

2, 15, 22, 23

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (3) (1986)

iii

1

JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(3) (1986).

Defendants/appellants submit this brief

in opposition to the action taken by the Fourth Judicial District
Court

for

Utah

County,

State

of

Utah,

in

convicting

defendants/appellants of burglary, a second degree felony, on
April 7, 1988.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is taken from a final judgment of the
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, State of Utah.
All three defendants/appellants were found guilty to a charge of
burglary, a second degree felony, arising out of an altercation
at the house of the defendants/appellants James L. Sandoval's
former mother-in-law, LeAnn Preece.

Notice of appeal was filed

on June 22, 1988, with the Utah Supreme Court.

The case has

subsequently been assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals.
defendants/appellants

assert

that

the

trial

court

erred

The
in

concluding that the defendants/appellants possessed the requisite
intent necessary to sustain a conviction of burglary, a second
degree felony.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.

Whether the court committed error in concluding

that beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendants/appellants entered
the house of LeAnn Preece on or about September 6, 1987, or

remained unlawfully therein with the required specific intent as
set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1978)?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
On

April

7,

1988,

the

defendants/appellants

were

brought before the Honorable Cullen Y. Christensen, Judge of the
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, State of Utah,
sitting without a jury.

All three defendants/appellants were

accused by the State of Utah of burglary, a second degree felony,
and assault, a Class B misdemeanor.

The trial court concluded

that all three defendants/appellants were guilty of burglary, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202
(1978).

The trial court concluded further that the count of

assault was subsumed by the conviction of burglary and therefore
the

charge

of

assault

was

dropped

against

cill

three

defendants/appellants.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
On or about September 18, 1987, a criminal information

was filed by the State of Utah accusing the defendants/appellants
James L. Sandoval, Robert L. Sandoval, and Patrick Dominquez of
burglary, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§

76-6-202

violation

(1978),

of Utah

and

assault, a

Code Ann.

Class

§ 76-5-102
2

B misdemeanor, in
(1978).

The

first

appearance

hearing

was

held

on

October

2,

1987,

and

the

preliminary examination was held on November 30, 1987, with a
bind-over order being signed by the circuit court judge on that
date.

The defendants/appellants Robert L. Sandoval and Patrick

Dominquez

were

arraignment

brought

hearing

before
on

or

the

district

about

court

January

on

8,

an

1988.

Defendant/appellant James L. Sandoval was brought before the
court on an arraignment hearing on or about January 22, 1988.
This matter then came on for hearing before the Honorable Cullen
Y. Christensen, judge of the Fourth Judicial District Court of
Utah County, State of Utah, on February 9, 1988.
concluded

The court

that trial on the matter be continued due to the

illness of counsel for the State of Utah.

Thereafter this matter

came on regularly for hearing before Judge Christensen on April
7, 1988.
Judge

Christensen,

sitting

without

a

jury,

testimony presented by both sides and concluded as follows:
The court has reviewed the
evidence in this matter and has
reviewed the law as I see it
applicable to this case.
In this matter the defendants
are each charged with two counts,
one being burglary, a second degree
felony in violation of Section 766-202, Utah Code Annotated, 1983,
as amended, in that they, on or
about September 6, 1987, in Utah
County, Utah, did unlawfully enter

heard

or remain in the dwelling of LeAnn
Preece, with the intent to commit
assault upon LeAnn Preece, David
Preece, and Pamela Sandoval. Count
II, assault, a Class B misdemeanor,
in violation of 76-5-102, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that
they, on or about September 6,
1987, in Utah County, Utah, did
knowingly
and
intentionally
assault LeAnn Preece, David Preece,
and Pamela Sandoval, by attempting
to do bodily injury to LeAnn
Preece, David Preece, and Pamela
Sandoval, with unlawful force or
violence.
The elements of the charge of
burglary in this matter appear to
the Court to be these:
1.
That on or about the 6 th
of September, 1987, at Utah County,
Utah, the defendants did unlawfully
enter or remain in the dwelling of
LeAnn Preece, 3, with the intent to
commit an assault upon LeAnn
Preece, David Preece, and Pamela
Sandoval, or that they did so
knowingly and intentionally.
Burglary is defined in the
statute, to which reference is made
in the Information as this:
"A person
is guilty of
burglary if he enters or remains
unlawfully in a building or a
portion of a building with an
intent to commit an assault on any
person.
Burglary is a felony of
the third degree unless it was
committed in a dwelling, in which
event it is a felony of the second
degree."
An assault, by statute, 76-5102, is defined as:
"An attempt
with unlawful force or violence to
do bodily injury to another, or (b)
a threat accompanied by a show of
4

immediate force or violence to do
bodily injury to another."
"An attempt under the law is
described and defines as for the
purposes of that part is a person
is guilty of an attempt to commit a
crime if acting with the kind of
culpability otherwise required for
the commission of the offense, he
engages in conduct constituting a
substantial
step toward
the
commission of the offense."
The term "bodily injury" is
defined in the statute as being
"bodily injury means physical pain,
illness or any impairment of
physical conditions."
And, "a
statute determines and rules that a
person enters or remains unlawfully
in or upon premises when the
premises or any portion thereof at
the time of the entry or remaining
are not open to the public and when
the actor is not otherwise licensed
or privileged to enter or remain on
the premises or such portion
thereof."
There's another statute that
applies, it seems to the Court, in
this circumstance; and that is
Section 76-2-202:
"Criminal
responsibility
for
direct
commission of offense or for
conduct of another.
Every person
acting with the mental state
required for the commission of an
offense, who directly commits the
offense, who solicits, requests,
commands,
encourages
or
intentionally aids another person
to engage in conduct which
constitutes an offense, shall be
criminally liable as a party for
such conduct.
The statute further defines
the words "intentionally, or with
5

intent, or wilfully, or knowingly,
or with knowledge, as follows:"
This
is
Section
76-2-103.
"Intentionally or with intent or
wilfully with regard to the nature
of his conduct, a person engages in
conduct, intentionally or with
intent or wilfully with respect to
the nature of his conduct or to a
result of his conduct when it is
his conscious objective or desire
to engage in the conduct or cause
the result."
2.
"Knowingly or
with knowledge, with respect to his
conduct or his circumstances
surrounding his conduct when he is
aware of the nature of his conduct
or the existing circumstances, a
person acts knowingly or with
knowledge with respect to a result
of his conduct when he is aware
that his conduct is reasonably
certain to cause the result."
"A person engages in conduct
with criminal negligence or is
criminally negligent with respect
to circumstances surrounding his
conduct as a result of his conduct
when he ought to be aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk
that circumstances exist or the
results will occur."
Now, how does all of that
apply to the case that we have
before us today?
I appears to the Court that it
has been established beyond any
reasonable doubt:
that the
incident in this case occurred on
the 6th of September 1987; that it
did occur in Utah County; that the
defendants did unlawfully enter or
remain in the dwelling of Mrs.
Preece.
There is nothing in the record
in any way to suggest that they had
6

any right to be in that buidling
[sic], in that dwelling, under the
circumstances; even though they may
have been interested in retrieving
these children. And I think that's
what their intent was, is to
retrieve the children. They had no
legal right, no business going upon
the premises of Mrs. Preece under
the circumstances and without her
permission.
It's obvious, it's on the
record, even taking the evidence
the most favorable to the position
of the defendants in any respect,
that they did force their way into
that building, into that dwelling,
over the objection of Mrs. Preece
and of Mrs. Sandoval and of David
Preece.
The question then resolves
down to whether or not they had an
intent to commit an assault as they
entered upon that undertaking.
I think
the
facts
are
established beyond a reasonable
doubt, that these men were intent
upon
regaining
possession,
irrespective of what it took and
without any assistance, that they
were going to do it by self-help.
The evidence appears to be
clear and unrefuted that Pamela did
call James after she got up to her
mother's and told him that she had
the children, they were there for
visitation, and that James said
"I'm coming to get you"; that
Pamela felt threatened by that
circumstance.
The evidence is certainly
clear that Robert went in the
basement door of that dwelling, and
in a contest with Mrs. Preece over
the physical possession of the one
minor child, the testimony of Mrs.
7

Sandoval is that after they got
into the building that she scuffled
with Robert in an attempt to get
her son away from Robert, the
brother of the father of the child;
that Robert hit her, on the head,
that he stomped on her foot.
The evidence is unrefuted and
agreed upon that Robert and Mrs.
Preece engaged in a scuffle over
the possession of the child, and
that that scuffle ensued from the
outside into the building, and that
Robert pursued the child and Mrs.
Preece into the building. And the
Court finds that there is no doubt,
any reasonable doubt, about the
fact that Mrs. Preece was pushed
and shoved and that she did sustain
inj ury.
There is no dispute from
anyone's part that there was a
considerable amount of scuffling
and running about in that place,
there was a lot of anger exhibited.
And the evidence, irrespective of
whether or not the poker was
actually used by James, the
evidence is clear that he was in a
position standing over Mrs. Preece
with the poker in a spear-position
and only relinquished that position
when David came upon the scene with
the gun in his hand and ordered
them out or that he would shoot.
It appears to the Court, of
course intent is a subjective
thing, no one can look into one's
mind and tell what is there. The
only way we can arrive at that is
by the actions that one undertakes.
And it appears clear to the Court
that there can be no doubt, no
reasonable doubt, that these men
had the intent to enter that
building, that they had the intent
8

to take whatever steps were
necessary, to inflict whatever
injury was necessary to gain
possession of those children. They
had the physical force, they had
the ability, they had a show of
force.
There were three men
against two women and a child.
There isn't any question that these
men, in the view of the Court, were
acting intentionally, that they
were
acting
knowingly,
the
consequences of what they were
doing; and that evidence of their
intent to commit assault is further
substantiated by the fact that they
did in fact perpetrate and inflict
injury upon Mrs. Preece and upon
Mrs. Sandoval.
So that the case that the
Court has found and the Court
believes that the perpetration of a
battery necessarily implies intent.
While "intent" may not—"attempt"
may not imply a battery or a
completion
of the act, the
completion of the act certainly
includes the attempt that the
statute prohibits.
So the Court, consequently,
finds beyond a reasonable doubt
that these men, and each of them,
did have the intent when they
entered that building to perpetrate
an assault upon the occupants
thereof.
The Court believes that they
are each responsible, under the
circumstances, for the actions of
the others, since it was a
concerted effort on their part,
they were aiding and abetting each
other when they went into that
building, and that, therefore,
under the statute they are all
three charged as principals.
9

So the Court, consequently,
finds each of you men guilty of the
charge contained in Count I of the
Information.
With respect to Count II, that
being the assault charge, it
appears to the Court that since
that is necessarily an included
offense with the Count I of
burglary, the Court could not find
them guilty of Count I without
finding then that they are guilty
of Count II, that being assault. I
don't believe that the law would
permit them to be punished or
charged[] of[sic] convicted of
that Count II.
The Court refers in that
respect to the case of State of
Utah vs. Bradley, 19 Utah Advance
Report 4, which makes reference to
a case of State vs. Hill, 674
Pacific 2d 96, and State vs. Baker,
671 Pacific 2d 152, when it
indicates that those charges then
as a matter of law stand in the
relationship of greater and lesser
offenses, and the defendant cannot
be convicted or punished for both.
So the Court finds in this
circumstance and believes that the
finding of guilt on the first Count
necessarily includes a violation of
at least Count II and, therefore,
that they cannot be punished for
both Counts and that Count II
should, therefore, for that reason
be dismissed.
Transcript of trial, pp. 145-153.
C.

DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT
On May 20, 1988, all three of the defendants/appellants

were

brought

before

Judge

Christensen
10

for

pronouncement

of

judgment.

All three were given the same sentence.

Each received

a suspended prison sentence and was placed on probation for
eighteen (18) months with the following conditions:
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

The

Each defendant was to enter an agreement
with the Adult Probation and Parole
Department and comply strictly with the
terms of probation.
Each defendant was to make himself available to
the Department and the Court when requested to do
so.
Each defendant was to agree that he would violate
no laws of the United States, Utah, or any
municipality wherein he may reside.
Each defendant agreed to pay a $750 fine or
complete 15 0 hours of Alternative Community
Service.
Each defendant agreed to make restitution of
$944.21 or such other sums as agreed upon or
determined by the Court after a restitution
hearing.
Each defendant was to serve 30 days in the Utah
County Jail. The 30 days to be served within the
next 90 days. If, at the end of 90 days, the jail
time had not been completed, each defendant was to
report to the jail and commence serving the
balance of the jail time.
order

of

commitment

of

all

of

the

defendants/appellants has been stayed pending this appeal to the
Utah Court of Appeals.
D.

RELEVANT FACTS
On or about July 31, 1986, defendant/appellant James L.

Sandoval was divorced from his former wife, Pamela A. Sandoval,
and legal custody of his three minor children, Chanay, Shane,
and Jesse, was awarded to James L. Sandoval.
11

See appendix.

It

is undisputed that at the time of the occurrence on September 6,
1987, defendant/appellant James L. Sandoval still retained legal
custody of those minor children.
by Pamela A. Sandoval,
On

or about

This fact was admitted at trial

Transcript of trial, p. 5.
September

6,

1987, defendant/appellant

James L. Sandoval, along with his three children, was visiting
his parents when his former wife, Pamela A. Sandoval, obtained
possession

of the

children without the consent of James L.

Sandoval.

Pamela A. Sandoval admitted at trial that she neither

notified nor asked James L. Sandoval for permission to take the
children.

Transcript of trial, pp. 8., 17.

At trial, Pamela A.

Sandoval stated that she "merely took the children."

Transcript

of trial, p. 16.

That Pamela A. Sandoval did not request

permission

the

to

take

children

is

testimony of James L. Sandoval at trial.

also

supported

by

the

Transcript of trial, p.

113.
Upon discovering the absence of the children, James L.
Sandoval immediately called the police.

This fact is supported

by the testimony of Officer Philip Webber at trial.
of trial, p. 58.

Transcript

After notifying the police that the children

had been taken, the defendants/appellants James L. Sandoval, his
brother, Robert L. Sandoval, and a friend, Patrick Dominquez,
proceeded to search for the whereabouts of the children.
12

The defendants/appellants first proceeded to the house
of Robert L. Sandoval's ex-wife.

This is supported by the

testimony at trial by Robert Sandoval and Patrick Dominquez.
Transcript of trial, pp. 92, 102.

Upon discovering that the

children were not at this location, defendant/appellant James L.
Sandoval called the police for a second time requesting police
assistance in obtaining possession of his children.

This is

supported by testimony of Officer Webber as well as testimony of
Robert L. Sandoval.

Transcript of trial, pp. 59, 83.

The defendants/appellants then proceeded to the house
of Pamela A. Sandoval's mother, LeAnn Preece, in an attempt to
find the children there.

Upon arriving at the Preece residence,

the defendants/appellants saw that the children were outside on
the lawn with Pamela A. Sandoval and Mrs. Preece.

This is

supported by the testimony at trial of Pamela A. Sandoval and
Robert Sandoval.
At

Transcript of trial, pp. 10, 83.

trial,

defendants/appellants

Robert
had

Sandoval
discussed

testified
the

that

possibility

the
that

Pamela A. Sandoval might take possession of the children and
leave the state.

Transcript of trial, p. 83-84.

This is

supported by the testimony at trial of James L. Sandoval wherein
he stated that Pamela A. Sandoval had threatened to take the
children from him on various occasions.
13

Transcript of trial, pp.

112,

119.

Against

this backdrop, the

defendants/appellants

entered the house whereupon a scuffle ensued resulting in slight
bodily

injuries.

There

is ample

support

in the record to

indicate that the defendant/appellants were attempting to regain
possession of the children throughout the scuffle.

For example,

Robert Sandoval testified that he was involved in a pulling match
with Mrs. Preece in an attempt to obtain possession of the minor
child Jesse.

Transcript of trial, p. 86.

This fact is also

substantiated by the testimony of Pamela A. Sandoval.
of trial, p. 12.

Transcript

Moreover, David Preece, witness for the State

of Utah, stated that Robert Sandoval entered the home,, then ran
past David Preece "to look upstairs for the children."

He then

testified that Robert Sandoval "didn't attempt to hit him or
anything."

Transcript of trial, p. 54.

The defendants/appellants were subsequently arrested,
tried, and convicted of burglary, a second degree felony.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The

trial

court,

sitting

without

a

jury,

wrongly

concluded that the defendants/appellants possessed the specific
intent necessary to sustain a conviction for burglary.

Testimony

contained in the record clearly supports the assertion made by
the

defendants/appellants

premises

of the

that

they

entered

Preece residence with the
14

possession

the

intent to regain

possession of the children who were lawfully within the custody
of defendant/appellant James L. Sandoval.

Because of this error,

the defendants/appellants were wrongfully convicted of burglary,
a second degree felony, and that conviction should be reversed by
the Utah Court of Appeals,
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS POSSESSED THE SPECIFIC
INTENT REQUIRED TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION OF
BURGLARY UNDER UTAH CODE ANN, S 76-6-202
(1978).
The trial court, sitting without a jury, concluded that
the defendants/appellants entered the premises of Mrs, Preece
with

the

intent

to

do

possession of the children.

"whatever

was

necessary"

to

regain

That conclusion does not satisfy the

specific intent requirement which is set forth in Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-202 (1978) as follows:
Burglary.—(1) A person is guilty
of burglary if he enters or
remains unlawfully in a building or
any portion of a building with
intent to commit a felony or theft
or commit an assault on any person.
(2) Burglary is a felony of
the third degree unless it was
committed in a dwelling, in which
event it is a felony of the second
degree.
(Emphasis added.)
15

In Utah, burglary is a "specific intent" crime.
intent called

The

for under the Utah Code is specific intent to

commit a "felony, theft or assault."

In order to sustain a

conviction on a charge of burglary, the specific intent must be
proved, or circumstances shown from which the intent may be
reasonably be inferred.

State v. Clements, 488 P.2d 1044 (Utah

1971).
The

Utah

Supreme

Court

discussed

the

differences

between crimes with specific intent as opposed to crimes of
general intent in the case of Peck v. Dunn, 574 P.2d 367 (Utah
1978) .

Beginning at page 369 of the reported opinion, the Utah

Supreme Court states as follows:
We recognize, of course, that most
crimes require a criminal intent in
the doing of the act prohibited.
Some require only a general intent
to do an act, which is evil in
itself.
Examples are acts like
murder, rape, kidnapping, which are
said to be malum in se. In such
circumstances, a person is presumed
to intend the natural consequences
of his act and the general criminal
intent with which an act was done
may be inferred from the words and
conduct of the actor.
There are other crimes which
require a specific intent. In them
the prosecution must prove the
intent with which the act was done.
For example, the elements of the
crime of burglary are: (1) the act
of entering a building, and (2) the
16

specific intent to commit a "felony, theft or assault11 therein.
The entering of a building is not
inherently evil, and that act alone
does not give rise to a presumption
or an inference that the actor
entered with the requisite intent
to constitute burglary.
In
addition to the entry, the intent
to commit a "felony, theft or
assault" therein must be proved, or
circumstances shown from which the
intent may reasonably be inferred.
Id. at 369-370 (emphasis added).
The specific intent necessary to sustain the conviction
of the defendants/appellants could not be reasonably adduced from
the evidence presented

at trial.

The record

is deplete of

evidence to contradict the defendants/appellants1 assertion that
they entered the home of Mrs. Preece with the intent of regaining
possession

of

the

children

within

defendant/appellant James L. Sandoval.

the

lawful

custody

of

Moreover, the record

indicates that the trial judge erroneously based the conviction
of the defendants/appellants upon a finding of general intent,
not of specific intent as called for by the statute.
Beginning at page 149 of the trial transcript, the
trial judge's comments are recorded as follows:
The question then resolves
down to whether or not they had an
intent to commit an assault as they
entered upon that undertaking.
I think the facts are established beyond a reasonable doubt,
17

that these men were intent upon
regaining possession
[of the
children of James L. Sandoval!,
irrespective of what it took and
without any assistance, that they
were going to do it by self-help.
(Emphasis added.)
At this point in the trial, the record indicates that
the trial judge clearly recognized that the defendant/appellants
possessed the intent of regaining possession of the children upon
entering

Mrs.

Preece's

house.

At

transcript, the trial judge concluded

page

150

that the

of

the

trial

"evidence is

certainly clear" that Robert Sandoval was involved in a "contest
with Mrs. Preece over the physical possession of the one minor
child."

Moreover, the judge then concludes that the "evidence is

unrefuted and agreed upon that Robert Sandoval and Mrs. Preece
engaged in a scuffle over the possession of the child,"
In spite of concluding that the defendants/appellants
possessed the specific intent of regaining possession of the
children, the trial court then proceeds to conclude that the
defendants/appellants

"had the intent to take whatever steps

were necessary, to inflict whatever injury was necessary, to gain
possession of those children."

Transcript of trial, p. 151.

No

evidence was presented by the State of Utah which would in any
way indicate that the defendant/appellants had a predisposition
to violence upon entering Mrs. Preece's residence.
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Counsel for defendants/appellants recognizes that the
specific

intent

with

which

entry

is made, for purposes of

burglary, is rarely susceptible of direct proof.

As pointed out

by Judge Christensen it is difficult to know what was in another
person's

mind.

However,

circumstantial evidence:

intent

may

be

"inferred

from

the manner of entry, the time of day,

the character and contents of the building, the person's actions
after entry, the totality of the surrounding circumstances, and
the intruder's explanation.
(Utah 1985);

State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174, 1177

see State v. Sisneros, 631 P.2d 856 (Utah 1981);

State v. Hopkins, 359 P.2d 486 (Utah 1960); see also State v.
Brooks, 631 P.2d 878 (Utah 1981); State v. Tellav. 324 P.2d 490
(Utah 1958) .
focused

From the record it appears that the trial court

exclusively

on the acts of the defendants/appellants

after entry into the home of Mrs. Preece.
to take into account

The trial court failed

that defendants/appellants entered the

house in pursuit of the children in broad daylight in hopes of
preventing the children from being absconded or injured.
trial

court

completely

disregarded

the explanation

The

given at

trial by the defendants/appellants.
From
particularity

the

established

above, it

facts

is unrefuted

as

set

forth

that in July

with

1986 the

defendant/appellant James L. Sandoval obtained a divorce decree
19

from his

former wife, Pamela A. Sandoval.

In that divorce

decree the legal custody of the three minor children of their
marriage was awarded to James L. Sandoval.
On the Labor Day weekend of 1987, defendant/appellant
James L. Sandoval, with his three children, was visiting the
children's paternal grandparents in Utah.

While at the home of

the paternal grandparents, Pamela A. Sandoval obtained possession
of the children without notifying or obtaining the consent or
permission of James L. Sandoval.

Thereafter, James L. Sandoval

notified the police and informed them that his children had been
taken

and

were

suspected

to

be

in

the

possession

of Mr.

Sandoval•s ex-wife.
Fearing that the safety of the children was at stake or
that the children might be transported out of state by Pamela A.
Sandoval, James L. Sandoval, along with his brother and close
friend, proceeded to search for the children with the intent of
regaining

possession

of

them.

As

legal

custodian

of

the

children James L. Sandoval had the legal duty and right to the
custody and care of the children.
While

the

record

contains

a

somewhat

confused

and

contradictory description of what occurred at the home of Mrs.
Preece, it remains undisputed that all parties to the altercation
were concerned with the possession and custody of the children.
20

Testimony presented to the trial court by both the State of Utah
and the defendants/appellants indicates that there was a struggle
and

anger

children.
assault

was

displayed

over

the

possession

of

the

minor

Reasonable minds could differ on the allegations that
was

testimony

committed

of

conclusion

the

that

by

the

defendants/appellants.

defendants/appellants

the

supports

defendants/appellants

a

were

The

contrary

in

fact

the

victims not the perpetrators of the alleged assault.
At the time of entry, defendants/appellants did not
have the specific intent to commit a "felony, theft or assault."
While the thought of self-help may have existed upon entry, the
specific underlying
children.

The

intent was to recover possession of the

trial

concluded

such,

but

then

wrongfully

concluded that the defendants/appellants had the "intent to take
whatever steps were necessary, to inflict whatever injury was
necessary to gain possession of those children."

Transcript of

trial, p. 151. This conclusion evidences the trial court's error
of

confusing

and

interchanging

the

general

defendants/appellants with their specific intent.
"take whatever

steps were necessary"

inclusive statement.

intent

of

the

The intent to

is an extremely broad,

Includable within this intent would be

acts, both violent or nonviolent, passive or active, overt or
covert.

Surely such a broad intent is not within the much more
21

narrowly defined specific intent called for by Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-202.
The specific felonious intent must exist at the time of
entry, and if it is not formed in the mind of the offender, there
is no burglary.

The Utah Supreme Court recognized this principal

long ago in the case of State v. Evans, 74 Utah 389, 279 P. 950
(1929) where it held in a prosecution for second degree burglary
that the intent with which the defendant entered the structure
was the crux of the case.

Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has

subsequently stated that the mere unlawful entry into private
premises may not alone support a finding of intent.

State v.

Pitts. 728 P.2d 113 (Utah 1986).
The

facts

presented

at

trial

substantiate

the

defendants/appellants assertion that their specific intent upon
entering Mrs. Preece's house was to regain possession of James L.
Sandoval's children.

The State presented no evidence to indicate

a contrary intent of the defendants/appellants.

In fact, the

testimony of David Preece cited above would indicate that clearly
the defendant/appellant Robert L. Sandoval had no intention to
assault anyone.

Robert did, after all, run past David without

any threat of violence whatsoever.
—Robert's

entry

into

Mrs.

Hence, at that point in time

Preece's

house—the

evidence

unrefutably establishes the lack of specific intent to commit an
22

assault on the part of Robert L. Sandoval.

Moreover, the fact

that James L. Sandoval repeatedly called the police before going
to the Preece residence indicates his intent to avoid violence.
With regard to all three defendants/appellants the State of Utah
relies

exclusively

upon

the

alleged

acts

of

assault

which

allegedly took place once the defendants/appellants were in Mrs.
Preecefs house.
claim

that

No evidence presented substantiated the State's

defendants/appellants

had

the

assault upon entering Mrs. Preece's house.

specific

intent to

It is fundamental

that "the State carries the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt each element of an offence."

State v. Hill, 727 P.2d 221,

222

burden

(Utah

1986).

Because

that

has

not

been met,

defendants/appellants ask the Utah Court of Appeals to overturn
the trial court's conviction.
CONCLUSION
To sustain a burglary charge under Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-202, the State must prove that the defendants/appellants
possessed a specific intent to commit a felony, theft or assault.
The defendants/appellants

respectfully

assert that

the trial

court erred in concluding that such a specific intent existed.
The

evidence

contained

in

the

record

indicates

that

the

defendants/appellants entered the premises owned by Mrs. Preece
with the specific intent of regaining possession of the minor
23

children of James L. Sandoval.

There is not sufficient evidence

contained in the record to support the decision of the trial
court that the defendants/appellants entered Mrs. Preece's house
with the specific
premises.

intent to commit an assault while on the

Statements by the trial court would indicate confusion

between the concept of general intent and the concept of specific
intent.
Given

the

totality

of

the

circumstances,

the

defendants/appellants maintain that evidence was not presented
upon which the trial court could reasonably conclude that the
defendants/appellants had specific intent to commit an assault.
The trial court erred in concluding that such an intent existed
and

in

convicting

the

second degree felony.

defendants/appellants

of

burglary,

a

Based upon the foregoing analysis and

authority, the defendants/appellants respectfully reojuest that
the conviction handed down by Judge Cullen Y. Christensen of the
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, State of Utah, be
reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on September

, 1988.

MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING

J. Bruce Reading
Attorney for
Defendants/Appellants
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Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that I caused four true and exact
copies of the foregoing brief of defendants/appellants to be
served via first-class, postage prepaid, mail on the

day of

September, 1988, addressed to attorney for plaintiff/respondent:
Mr. Steven B. Killpack, Utah County Attorney, 37 East Center
Street, Suite 200, Provo, Utah 84601.

25

APPENDIX
DECREE OF DIVORCE, ENTERED JULY 31, 1986, BY
THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, CASE NO. CV-86-864

F H BUTTERFIELD
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
140 West, 800 North, Suite 204
Orem, Utah 84057
225-4170
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY,

UTAH

JAMES LINDSEY SANDOVAL,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. CV

VS.

DECREE

PAMELA ANNE SANDOVAL,

OF

86

864

DIVORCE

Defendant.

The Court having now made and entered its Findings OF Fact
and Conclusions of Law in this matter, and the Court now being fully
advised;
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1. That Plaintiff, James Lindsey Sandoval is hereby awarded a
Decree of Divorce from the Defendant, Pamela Anne Sandoval, the same to
become final forthwith when signed by the Court and entered in the Register
of Actions in the Office of the Utah County Clerk, and the parties are
hereby restored to the status of single and unmarried persons.
2. The care, custody and control of the three minor children
of the parties, Chanay, Shane and Jesse Sandoval is hereby awarded to the
Plaintiff, subject to reasonable rights of visitation of the Defendant.
3. The Plaintiff is hereby awarded, and the Defendant is
herebe ORDERED TO PAY TO THE Plaintiff

the sum of £hftlEJ00 per month,

per child as child support, the same to commence with the month of

^

yo, <?o

August, 1986. Like sums of 4*SdSftfr per month

per child are to be

paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff each and every month
thereafter until the further Order of the Court,
4. Neither party is awarded alimony.
5. Each party is awarded the personal property which he/she
now has In his/her possession.
6. The Court retains jurisdiction to issue an Order of
Withhold and Deliver upon the employer of the Defendant, should she
become delinquent in hersupport payments more than thirty days.
7. ThezB*&mtmBT*La Ordered to maintain medical and dental
insurance coverage on the minor children where the same is available
at her place of employment.
8. The Plaintiff Is hereby awarded Judgment, as against
the Defendant in the sum of $250.00

for the use and benefit of his

attorney in this matter.
DATED and Signed at Provo, Utah County,
ON THIS

S/—

day of
of
day

j£*^

State of UTAH,

, 1986.

BY

THE

COURT:

